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ABSTRACT.  
 
Business angel investing – a key source of finance for entrepreneurial businesses – is rapidly 
evolving from a fragmented and largely anonymous activity dominated by individuals 
investing on their own to one that is increasingly characterised by groups of investors investing 
together through managed angel groups. The implications of this change have been largely 
ignored by scholars. The paper examines the investment activity and operation of angel groups 
in Scotland to highlight the implications of this change for the nature of angel investing. It goes 
on to argue that this transformation challenges both the ongoing relevance of prior research on 
business angels and current methodological practices, and raises a set of new research 
questions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Meyer (2011: 6) has recently criticised entrepreneurship research for becoming method-
centred and increasingly based on the sophisticated manipulation of data bases which, he 
argues, “distance researchers from actual people and behaviours that catalyse entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurship”. This has several implications for entrepreneurship research. First, 
research topics are chosen on the basis of the availability of datasets rather than their 
intellectual or practical significance. Second, it results in a detachment from the ‘real world’ 
of the entrepreneur which, in turn, creates the risk that processes and changes, for example, in 
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terms of actors, institutions and behaviour, go unobserved, and research loses its relevance. 
As a consequence the ability of scholars to contribute to policy and practice is reduced. 
 
These concerns are particularly evident in business angel research. The invisible nature of 
business angels, the lack of databases which capture their investments and the reluctance 
amongst the small population of visible angels to take part in surveys have meant that the 
topic has attracted relatively little research. In addition, its methodological sophistication has 
been weak, especially in comparison with venture capital and private equity research which 
have attracted significantly more studies, many of them based on quantitative research 
methods. This is at odds with the relative importance of these sources of entrepreneurial 
finance: business angels finance significantly more businesses than venture capital funds, and 
at the start-up stage the amount that they invest is also greater (Mason and Harrison, 2000a; 
Sohl, 2012; EBAN 2015).  
 
This paper examines how the angel market is changing quite fundamentally from an 
atomistic, fragmented and largely invisible market comprising almost entirely individuals 
investing on their own or in ad hoc small groups to one that is increasingly characterised by 
highly visible angel groups and syndicates which consolidate and channel finance from 
individual investors to entrepreneurial ventures. The implications of this evolution of the 
angel market have been largely ignored by scholars. The consequence is that our 
understanding of the operation of the market remains based on studies of individual angels – 
which is now only part of the overall angel market - and does not provide insights into the 
operation and investment activity of angel groups. This paper is the first to explicitly and 
systematically examine this transformation of the angel market. It builds on previous papers 
on the overall evolution of the early stage risk capital market (Harrison et al 2010a), the 
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evolution of specific business angel groups (Gregson et al 2013), group investment decision-
making (Carpentier and Suret, 2015: Croce et al, 2016a; Mason and Botelho, 2016) and the 
emergence of the angel group gatekeeper as a new actor in the market (Paul and Whittam 
2010). Based on a case study of Scotland, where this market evolution has proceeded the 
furthest, the paper addresses the following key issues. First, what are the implications of the 
growth of angel groups for the financing of entrepreneurial ventures? Second, to what extent 
does this render redundant our existing understanding of the investment process which is 
derived from studies based on individual investors? Third, what are implications for 
methodology? And finally, what are the research questions that arise as a consequence of this 
change? 
 
The next section of the paper discusses the drivers that are transforming the nature of angel 
investing. This is followed by an examination of the angel market in Scotland where this 
change has proceeded the furthest outside of the USA. The final section examines the 
implications of this change for future research on business angels. 
 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF BUSINESS ANGEL INVESTING 
Business angels – a definition 
Business angels can be defined as high net worth individuals who invest their own money, 
either alone or with others, directly in unquoted businesses in which there is no family 
connection. They normally invest in the form of equity finance in the hope of achieving a 
significant financial return through some form of exit. Typically they will also take an active 
involvement in their investee businesses (Mason, 2006). Investments by business angels are 
largely focused on new and early stage technology ventures (Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Mason 
and Harrison, 2010; 2011; Madill et al, 2005). They are particularly important from a regional 
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economic development perspective because the majority of their investments are local 
(Harrison et al, 2010b; Avdeitchikova, 2009), hence they are typically recycling and 
reinvesting locally-created wealth (e.g. from the sale of a business – Mason and Harrison, 
2006). Given the geographical concentration of venture capital investing in core regions 
(Mason and Harrison 2002a; Zook, 2004; Mason, 2007: Mason and Pierrakis, 2013) business 
angels are particularly important in peripheral regions.  
 
The importance of business angels in supporting the development of a dynamic entrepreneurial 
economy has been recognised by both national and regional governments in various countries. 
Angel investment activity is encouraged in a variety of ways, notably through tax incentives 
and support for business angel networks and other types of intermediary which introduce angels 
and entrepreneurs seeking finance to one another (Mason, 2009a; OECD, 2011). The recent 
establishment of co-investment schemes has also helped, either directly or indirectly, to boost 
angel investment activity (Owen and Mason, 2016). This has brought business angel investing 
into the realm of economic development, giving government a legitimate interest in what would 
otherwise be a private activity. The different objectives of investors and government 
departments and agencies creates a potential source of tension, an issue that we revisit in the 
conclusion. 
 
The Emergence of Angel Networks and Groups 
Angel Networks 
In the 1980s and 1990s angels operated anonymously, investing for the most part on their own 
or with small groups of friends and business associates in ventures that they came across 
through their personal social and business networks. Not surprisingly, the angel market 
operated inefficiently, with both investors and entrepreneurs incurring high search costs in 
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identifying one another, and often giving up as a result (Wetzel, 1986). It was very much an ad 
hoc activity for most investors and levels of professionalism were correspondingly low (Blair, 
1996). Meanwhile, entrepreneurs typically did not understand how to make themselves 
‘investment ready’ (Mason and Harrison, 2001; 2002b). An early market intervention, 
pioneered in the USA (Wetzel, 1984; Wetzel and Freear, 1996) and Canada (Blatt and Riding, 
1996) and subsequently adopted in Europe, was the creation of business angel networks – 
essentially introduction services – which provided a communication channel to enable 
entrepreneurs to get their investment proposal to the attention of potential investors and for 
angels to examine investment opportunities without compromising their privacy (Mason and 
Harrison, 1996a). Subsequently some of these networks also delivered investment readiness 
programmes (Mason and Harrison, 2001; Mason and Kwok, 2010) and angel training (San José 
et al, 2005). The difficulties in developing a commercially viable model for this service has 
meant that most networks have relied on government funding, and several in the UK have 
closed after losing this support. Those which operate commercially levy a fee on the 
investments that they facilitate. This business model requires a focus on larger deals (Mason 
and Harrison, 1997). Evidence on the effectiveness of networks is mixed but broadly positive 
(Mason and Harrison, 1996b; 1999; 2002b; Collewaert et al, 2010). 
 
Angel Groups 
The angel market began to transform in the late-1990s as angels started to organise themselves 
into groups to invest collectively. This trend has proceeded furthest in the USA. The Band of 
Angels, which was founded in Silicon Valley in 1995, is generally – but inaccurately (see 
below) - regarded as the first organised group to be formed. Others, such as Tech Coast Angels 
(1997), Sierra Angels (1997), Common Angels (1997) and The Dinner Club (1999), soon 
followed (Preston 2007). Between 1996 and 2006 the number of identifiable business angel 
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organisations in the US grew from 10 to over 250 (Preston 2007). The Angel Capital 
Association, covering the USA and Canada, was created in 2003 for the purposes of 
transferring best practice, lobbying and data collection. It now comprises more than 240 formal 
angel groups, plus some affiliate members. There is growing evidence of specialisation by 
industry sector (e.g. health care angel groups) and type of investor (e.g. women-only angel 
groups). In Europe, there has been a similar expansion in the angel market but, with the 
exception of Scotland (Harrison et al 2010a; Gregson et al 2013a) – which is the focus for this 
paper - it has evolved differently, favouring angel networks which, as noted above, provide 
mechanisms connecting angels with entrepreneurs seeking finance (Mason, 2009a). In the case 
of Scotland, the number of identifiable groups has grown from 2 to over 20 between 2000 and 
2012, the most radical shift in market organisation of any region in Europe. Moreover, 
Archangel Investors, the oldest and largest such group, was founded in 1992, and so is older 
than its better known US counterparts. Indeed, if Scotland was a US state it would be the 11th 
largest in terms of angel group investment activity in absolute terms whereas it ranks only 29th 
in terms of GDP per capita (Grahame, personal communication). Angel groups are now found 
throughout the world (OECD 2011). However, scholars have been slow to react to this 
organisational transformation of the angel market. The literature base comprises a handful of 
case studies (mainly written by practitioners) (May and Simmons, 2001; May, 2002; Cerullo 
and Sommer, 2002; Payne and Mccarty, 2002; May and O’Halloran, 2003) and just a few 
scholarly studies (Sudek, 2006; Gregson et al 2013a; Carpentier and Suret, 2015; Croce et al, 
2016a) and general discussion (Mason, 2006; Sohl, 2007; 2012). 
 
Angel groups have emerged for two main reasons. First, business angels have difficulties in 
investing alongside venture capital funds (VCFs) because of the investment instruments 
which VCFs use, notably, liquidation preferences, anti-dilution rights, special subscription 
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rights and enhanced follow-on rights. This became apparent during the dot.com crash of the 
early 2000s. At this time many of the companies that had been financed in the ‘bubble’ of the 
late 1990s were running out of cash. The huge fall in valuations in the crash meant that 
venture capitalists had to write down the value of many of the investments that they had 
already made. The consequence was that those companies that did raise further funding were 
refinanced at lower prices. As the initial investors in these businesses, angels were 
particularly vulnerable in these, so-called, down-rounds. Unable, or unwilling, to provide new 
cash their investments were typically wiped out. This resulted in angels losing trust in venture 
capitalists and since then many have sought to avoid investing in deals that are likely to 
require follow-on funding from venture capitalists. This, in turn, has led to a growing 
segmentation in the early stage risk capital market (Harrison et al, 2010a). A further difficulty 
is that business angels and venture capital funds have different objectives. This is particularly 
clear at the exit stage where, as Peters (2009) has noted, venture capital funds will refuse to 
exit at a valuation that is perfectly acceptable to angel investors but is below their ‘hurdle 
rate’ because it would affect their ability to raise a new fund. Second, the decline in the 
venture capital industry and its reorientation to larger, later stage deals since the dot.com 
crash (Clark, 2014) has meant that opportunities for angels to pass on their investments to 
venture capital funds for follow-on funding are much more restricted, necessitating angels to 
make follow-on investments themselves. In other words, as the market has evolved there are 
fewer opportunities for sequential investment complementarities between the angel and VC 
investor communities (Freear and Wetzel, 1990; Harrison and Mason 2000).  
 
These developments have prompted individual angels to recognise the advantages of 
investing as part of a group rather than on their own, the most important of which are the 
volume and quality of the deal flow, reducing the personal effort involved in the investment 
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process, and the sharing of experience and knowledge, for example in the evaluation and due 
diligence stages (Mason and Botelho, 2014). Other attractions of groups are that they enable 
individual angels to invest in particular opportunities that they could never have invested in 
as individuals, offer the opportunity to learn from more experienced investors and provide 
opportunities for camaraderie and networking with like-minded individuals. Moreover, by 
grouping together they can aggregate their investment capacity and so have the ability to 
make bigger investments and follow-on investments, with the potential to take businesses to 
an exit themselves without the need for follow-on funding from venture capital funds. Several 
US groups have also established side-car funds, pooled investment vehicles that invest 
alongside the angel group. These open up angel investing to high net worth individuals who 
want to be passive investors. They also enable group members to allocate part of their funds 
in a balanced manner across all of the group’s investments. The presence of the sidecar fund 
enables the group to lead bigger investment rounds than the group of members themselves 
could afford. 
 
The emergence of angel groups is of enormous significance for the development and 
maintenance of an entrepreneurial economy. First, they reduce sources of inefficiency in the 
market which have arisen on account of the fragmented and invisible nature of angels. There 
were few other mechanism for angels to receive a steady flow of investment opportunities. 
Angel groups, in contrast, are generally visible and are therefore easier for entrepreneurs to 
approach, thereby reducing the search costs of both entrepreneurs and angels and increasing 
deal flow. A further source of inefficiency was that each investment made by an angel has 
typically been a one-off that was screened, evaluated and negotiated separately. However, the 
volume of investments that angel groups make enables them to develop efficient routines for 
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handling investment enquiries, screening opportunities and making investment agreements. 
The increased number of investors scrutinising potential risks also improves due diligence. 
 
Second, angel groups have stimulated the supply-side of the market. The advantages of 
investing as part of a group have also been attractive to high net worth individuals (HNWIs) 
who would not otherwise consider investing in emerging companies, for example, because they 
lack the time, referral sources, investment skills or ability to add value. Hence, angel groups 
are able to attract and mobilise funds that might otherwise have been invested elsewhere (e.g. 
property, stock market, collecting: Mason and Harrison, 2000b), thereby increasing the supply 
of early stage venture capital, and to invest it more efficiently and effectively.  
 
Third, angel groups are helping to fill the ‘new’ equity gap. The diminished number of venture 
capital funds have consistently raised their minimum size of investment and are increasingly 
abandoning the early stage market, either to invest in larger and later stage deals or simply 
because they have been unable to raise new funds from institutional investors (Mason, 2009b; 
Clark, 2014).1 Angel groups are now increasingly the only source of funding for new and 
emerging businesses seeking investments in the range £250,000 to £1 million (under $1m in 
the USA: Sohl, 2012). Moreover, as a consequence of their greater financial resources angel 
groups have the ability to provide follow-on funding. This overcomes one of the potential 
problems of raising money from individual business angels, namely that they often lack the 
financial capacity to provide follow-on funding. Consequently, the entrepreneur is forced to 
embark on a further search for finance. Moreover, in the event that the need for additional 
finance is urgent then both the entrepreneur and the solo angel will find themselves in a weak 
                                                          
1 Just 11% of investments by the UK’s venture capital and private equity sector was in seed and start-ups with 
a further 28% in early stage deals (BVCA, 2015). 
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negotiating position with potential new investors, resulting in a dilution in their investments 
and the imposition of harsh terms and conditions. With the withdrawal of many venture capital 
funds from the small end of the market individual angels and their investee businesses have 
increasingly been faced with the problem of the absence of follow-on investors. Because angel 
groups generally have greater financial firepower than individual angels or ad hoc angel groups 
to be able to provide follow-on financing, they are a more efficient source of finance for an 
entrepreneur because it avoids the need to start the search for finance anew each time a new 
round of funding is required.  
 
Fourth, the ability of angel groups to add value to their investments should be much greater. 
The range of business expertise that is found amongst angel group members – described by 
May and Simmons (2001: 156), leading angel group practitioners in the USA, as a 
“smorgasbord of advice and strategic services” - means that in most circumstances they are 
able to contribute much greater value-added to investee businesses than an individual business 
angel, or even most early stage venture capital funds. It has also been shown that the 
accreditation role of angel groups enables businesses that have raised finance from angel 
groups to more easily raise follow-on funding from venture capital funds (Lerner, et al, 2015). 
Finally, angel groups are the most frequent partners in public sector co-investment schemes 
(Mason, 2009a; Harrison et al, 2010a), acting as the focal point for the leveraging of additional 
funds into the entrepreneurial ecosystem. 
 
However, others are less sanguine about the emergence of angel groups. For example, Sohl 
(2012: 37) has suggested that “as angels are becoming more organised they are morphing into 
a portrait of venture capital funds and are losing some of the valuable characteristics of the 
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angel investor …”2 This, in turn, raises two specific concerns (Sohl, 2007; 2012). First, the 
emergence of angel groups will result in a reallocation of angel capital away from smaller, seed 
investing to bigger and later stage deals. Second, angel groups will simply attract 
“inexperienced wealthy individuals seeking a passive investment” rather than active angels 
who can contribute value added to their investee businesses (Sohl, 2007: 360). But whether 
these developments are inevitable remains contested. Concerns have also been expressed about 
the cost raising finance, and specifically the practice of some angel groups requiring 
entrepreneurs to ‘pay to pitch’ (Entrevestor.com, 2013) and taking fees in the form of a 
proportion of any funds that they raise. 
 
DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS 
This study is based on two sources: aggregate data on investment activity, which provides the 
basis for the next section, and interviews with angel group gatekeepers which is the key source 
for the following sections. Quantitative information on angel investment activity is derived 
from LINC Scotland (the trade body for angel groups in Scotland) and the Scottish Risk Capital 
Market Reports published by Young Company Finance in conjunction with Scottish Enterprise 
(Young Company Finance, 2012; 2014; 2015). LINC Scotland provided information on 
aggregate investment activity of angel groups complied on the basis of data provided by its 
members. The Scottish Risk Capital Market Reports are based on an examination of Companies 
House 88(2) returns for all companies that were known to have raised equity finance in the 
appropriate time period. These returns give the date and number of new shares issued, in most 
                                                          
2 This is illustrated by a report from the Boston Business Journal (15 April 2013), headlined “Common Angels 
eyes larger new fund, as group seeks to act more like a VC” which describes how Common Angels, a group of 
about 50 angels in the Boston area is in discussions to raise a pooled fund which will exceed its existing $13m 
fund. The new fund would make a similar number of investments but would invest more capital into each 
business. The report also notes that it has centralised it decision-making in an eight member committee. The 
report concludes that the end result of these changes is that “Common Angels is now operating more like a VC 
firm ...” (http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/startups/2013/04/commonangels-fund-venture-capital-
boston.html?page=2)  
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cases the price, but not the names of the investors which had to be identified from other sources 
(see Mason and Harrison, 2008 and Harrison et al, 2010a for further discussion of this source). 
 
This is complemented by information from 22 semi-structured interviews with gatekeepers of 
19 groups, 18 of which are based in Scotland.3 In three groups the gatekeeper role was shared 
by two individuals. In each case both individuals were interviewed. The groups that were 
interviewed included all 17 that are publicly listed on LINC Scotland’s web site. Two 
additional groups were interviewed. One was a UK-wide group with a very active Scottish 
branch but has no association with LINC. The other group is a Scottish Co-investment Fund 
partner that also has no association with LINC. There were also three other groups that were 
members of LINC Scotland but preferred anonymity. These groups were also invited to 
participate, via LINC Scotland, but declined to do so. At the time that the research was 
undertaken (2012-13) there were 24 angel groups identified in what was then the most recent 
Scottish Risk Capital Market Report (Young Company Finance, 2012). The groups not 
included in this study had either closed or were private offices of high net worth families whose 
investments and operations are much closer to venture capital investing than angel investing. 
The study therefore captured the vast majority of the participants in the market at the time that 
the study was undertaken.  
 
Securing the participation of such a high proportion of angel groups in the Scottish market was 
a considerable achievement. In many cases the initial response was not positive and follow-up 
approaches were required. As a consequence, the recruitment process took three months. It 
started with an initial email to the gatekeeper to request an interview. In several cases it was 
                                                          
3 Halo, which is based in Northern Ireland, is also a member of LINC Scotland 
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not possible to identify the gatekeeper, but in these cases the recipient of the email forwarded 
it to the relevant individual. 
  
Of the 22 interviewees, 20 were face-to-face and two were conducted on the telephone. All 
respondents agreed for the interview to be recorded for later transcribing. The interviews 
ranged in length from 37 to 93 minutes, with the average being about one hour. The face-to-
face interviews took place at a location of the interviewee’s convenience. Venues included the 
group’s office, coffee shops and the researcher’s office. We agreed with participants that 
information on individual groups would not be disclosed and that findings would be 
aggregated. Any references to specific groups are therefore based on information that is in the 
public domain (e.g. media, presentations). 
 
One of the main challenges of qualitative methods, such as interviews, is how to analyse the 
information that is collected. Several sections of the interviews were based on collecting 
quantifiable data, such as the amount invested, number of deals, and age of the group. However, 
other parts of the questionnaire, notably on the skills that a gatekeeper requires and their own 
learning in the role, were based on opinion and perceptions. This information has been 
examined by thematic analysis (Howitt and Cramer, 2007) for “identifying, analyzing and 
reporting patterns within data” (Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 79). Boyatzis (1998) describes the 
technique as a process of ‘encoding qualitative information’.  
 
ANGEL GROUPS IN SCOTLAND: GROWTH AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITY 
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The paper is largely based on Scotland.4 This is a particularly appropriate context in which to 
undertake this study. Scotland has experienced a rapid growth in the number of angel groups. 
The initial groups – Archangels and Braveheart – were established in the 1990s. In 2002  
LINC Scotland’s membership comprised 300 solo angels and these two groups which had 
about 70 angel members between them. By 2016 LINC Scotland had 21 groups in 
membership5, which it estimates comprise about 750 investors in total. As noted above, there 
are a small number of other groups that are not members of LINC Scotland. A handful of 
other groups have also been established but subsequently either closed or amalgamated. 
Individual membership of LINC Scotland is now below 100. At the time of the survey (2012-
2013) nearly one-third (six, or 30%) of the groups that were interviewed were three years old 
or less, underlining the recent growth in the formation of groups. Collectively the 18 Scottish 
groups had just over 1,000 members, although this will include some double counting of 
investors who are members of more than one group. Two groups have significant numbers of 
non-Scottish based members. Membership ranges from less than 10 to over 100. Reflecting 
the skewed nature of the angel markets6, the five groups with more than 100 members 
account for 70% of the total (Figure 1). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Two key drivers in the Scottish environment have resulted in this significant increase in angel 
group. First, LINC Scotland was created7 in 1992 as part of the Scottish Business Birth Rate 
Strategy as a conventional business angel network, responsible for both the demand and supply 
                                                          
4 Halo, the Northern Ireland investment group was also included as it is a member of LNC Scotland. 
5 Including Halo. 
6 Many aspects of the angel market exhibit a skewed distribution; for example, returns (dominated by failures) 
and number of investments/amount invested (large number of investors with few investments). 
7 It was actually created out of an existing organisation operated by Glasgow Opportunities to give it a pan-
Scotland focus. 
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sides of the market and seeking to make ‘introductions’ between investors and entrepreneurs 
that would lead to investments. Some ten years later Scottish Enterprise took increasing 
responsibility for the demand side, leaving LINC Scotland with an agreed remit to develop the 
supply side of the market. It took the strategic decision, influenced by the early successes of 
Braveheart and Archangels, that this would be most effectively achieved through the 
development of angel groups. Scottish Enterprise co-funds certain activities with LINC but 
does not provide core funding. LINC’s main sources of funding come from the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF)8 and the private sector. 
 
LINC actively sought to encourage its individual investors to band together. The older, 
established groups were willing to share their knowledge with the new groups. This helps to 
explain why, as we comment later, most of the groups have similar operating models. The 
visibility of angel groups and publicity for LINC’s activities created a momentum and other 
groups emerged independently of LINC’s efforts. These new groups typically grew out of 
existing groups of investors who were already working together informally and so had a ‘club’ 
mentality. However, they were required to find a chairman/gatekeeper, either from their own 
members or, less commonly, externally, in order to start investing. LINC Scotland was able to 
provide financial support new angel groups on account of its access to ERDF funding.  
 
The second driver was the Scottish Co-Investment Fund (SCIF) which came on stream in 2003 
in response to the acute shortage of risk capital in the aftermath of the dotcom crash. The SCIF 
was designed to invest alongside private sector investment partners on a pari passu basis, 
investing up to £1 for every £1 invested by the partner to a maximum of £1m per business (and 
with the introduction of follow-on funding from the Venture Fund deal sizes can be even 
                                                          
8 LINC Scotland has enterprise agency status which gives it direct access to apply for ERDF funding.  
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larger). The intention was to improve liquidity in the market, enabling partners to make bigger 
investments, or follow-on investments, and freeing up part of their funds to invest in new 
businesses rather than follow-on investments. The SCIF carried out due diligence on 
prospective partners before accepting them onto the scheme. The partners make their own 
investment decisions. SCIF does not undertake its own analysis on the investments that the 
partners propose to make. Their only decision was to confirm that the business fell within the 
rules of the scheme. The eligibility criteria were known to investors. Partners could seek initial 
approval of a prospective investment’s eligibility in principle at an early stage in their appraisal 
process. Once investment terms were agreed by the partner, SCIF approval, or not, was 
generally made within 24 hours of bringing an investment to the Fund. This high level of 
certainty was built into the scheme following consultation with the initial angel groups and, 
arguably, has been a key feature of its success.9 Although angel groups accounted for less than 
half of the Fund’s investment partners, the fund’s maximum investment limit meant that the 
vast majority of the deals that qualified were brought by angel groups rather than venture 
capital funds (Harrison 2009).  
 
The existence of the SCIF encouraged the emergence of groups in two respects. First, the SCIF 
wanted to expand its number of investment partners so welcomed the formation of new groups, 
especially in areas of the country where they were lacking. LINC Scotland was specifically 
contracted to support the creation of three new groups per annum to be co-investment partners. 
Second, angel groups received a 2.5% fee on completion of every co-investment deal that they 
participated in. This provided useful additional income to fund a group’s running costs, 
supporting salaries of a gatekeeper and possibly one or more administrative staff. 
                                                          
9 In contrast the UK Angel Co-Fund does undertake its own evaluation, creating uncertainty for its partners. 
This is the main criticism made by investors of the scheme (Owen and Mason, 2016). 
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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE  
 
Investment activity by angel groups has grown steadily since 2002-3, in terms of both number 
and amount invested, peaking in 2010 with 101 deals compared with just 22 in 2002-3. 
Investment activity has recovered since then, albeit erratically, with 98 deals in 2015 (Figure 
2). Only part of the recent rise in investments is due to activity of new groups that did not exist 
in 2010 (these groups made 8 investments in 2012). Moreover, investment activity is skewed 
to a small number of groups, with just two groups making 69% of the investments in the period 
2009-12. Almost every other group made less than 10 new investments in the period (i.e. 
excluding follow-on investments). The amount invested by members of the angel groups has 
risen from £6.3m in 2002-3 to a peak of £26.17m in 2011, and recovering to £19.04 in 2015 
(Figure 3). Total aggregate investment (i.e. including co-investors) has increased even more 
sharply, from £6.8m in 2002-03 to what was then a peak of £34.5m in 2011. Investment activity 
recovered quickly to reach a new peak of £44.5m in 2015 (Figure 4), reflecting both the growth 
of the SCIF and the increasing tendency for angel groups co-invest with other investors. This 
represents a significant part of the risk capital market in Scotland (Harrison et al 2010). Looking 
at the market as a whole, the Scottish Risk Capital reports show that venture capital funds 
dominate, accounting for well over half of investments by value in the period 2009-2014. 
Angels, by contrast, have accounted for between 10 and 15% (Table 1). This reflects the focus 
of venture capital funds on large investments. However, angels dominate the middle market 
which covers investments in the £100,000 - £2m range. In the 2012-2014 period angels (groups 
and individuals) made nearly three times the number made by venture capital funds, and 
invested 1.3 times the amount invested by venture capital funds (Table 2). Moreover, much of 
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the investment in the public sector category comprises the Scottish Co-Investment Fund which 
has largely invested alongside angel groups. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
            
Of course these investments represent only a fraction of the investment opportunities that the 
groups see. The number of opportunities seen by the groups in the 12 months prior to the 
interview range from under 10 (due to circumstances specific to that group) to over 250. 
However, the majority of groups saw between 40 and 150 investment opportunities (median = 
100). No doubt some opportunities will be seen by more than one group. The overall ‘yield 
rate’ – investments as a proportion of opportunities seen invested - was about 6.5%. This is 
significantly lower than the equivalent data reported by Sohl (2013) for US angel groups for 
the same time-period. Assuming that the difference is real, rather due to data or definitional 
differences, there are several possible explanations for this difference. It may reflect the poorer 
quality of opportunities that Scottish groups see, their more risk-averse screening and selection 
standards, or the superior investment capabilities of US groups (in terms of numbers of 
members and dollars available for investment). 
 
Angel groups typically invest anywhere from £25,000 to £500,000 per round, with a few 
outliers at each end. However, as the vast majority (85%) of deals had co-investors – almost 
invariably the SCIF – so deal sizes were larger. Nevertheless, more than 90% of deals in 2009-
10 were below £1m (the maximum allowable transaction under SCIF regulations). The 
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majority of this investment is follow-on funding. This peaked at over 80% at the start of the 
financial crisis but has fallen back since then to around 60% (Figure 5). 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE  
 
Scottish angel groups have a diverse range of investment preferences. This is particularly 
apparent in terms of sector, where two categories of groups can be identified. Six (of the 18) 
are specifically oriented to technology sectors, with some having a very specific investment 
focus (e.g. biopharmaceuticals, energy, life science) and two others have a ‘preference’ for 
technology. The remainder will invest in ‘everything’ or ‘everything except X’. There is less 
diversity in terms of the stage of development, with 15 groups looking to invest in early stage 
or start-up businesses. Two groups are focused on proof of concept and seed stages. There is 
also diversity in the size of investment. Three groups stated this was ‘unlimited’, two groups 
would invest up to £500,000, and three would go up to £1m. However, the majority of groups 
are looking to invest under £250,000 per deal, not including any coinvestment. Finally, the 
majority (12) of groups are looking to invest in Scotland, although in a few cases this was ‘not 
exclusive’. Four groups reported that they would invest worldwide, confirming that while angel 
investing is a local phenomenon it is not exclusively so (Harrison et al, 2010b) 
 
Follow-on investments have quickly dominated the investment activity of angel groups (Mason 
and Harrison, 2010; 2011: Sohl 2012). This may be a ‘natural’ process, reflecting a 
combination of the financial strength of angel groups to make follow-on investments and the 
lack of alternative investors to provide follow-on funding (Harrison et al 2010a). However, 
some groups have turned down the opportunity to bring institutional investors into deals, 
because of fears of both being diluted and also losing control of the investment, particularly 
the ability to influence, manage and control the exit. The need to invest in ordinary shares so 
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that investors qualify for tax relief under the Enterprise Investment Scheme is a further 
discouragement to seek follow-on funding from institutional investors. As discussed earlier, 
these investors will invest using preference shares and other more complex instruments which 
give them greater power over investors with ordinary shares.  
 
ANGEL GROUP INVESTMENT PROCESSES 
The investment process of angel groups is rather different to that of individual angels. Previous 
research has established that individual angels undertake an initial screening process to 
establish whether the proposal is a good fit with their investment criteria and would appear to 
have merit. This is typically a fast process, taking anything from one to twenty minutes (Mason 
and Rogers, 1997; Harrison et al., 2015), and upwards of 90% of proposals get rejected at this 
stage (Feeney et al, 1999). Those proposals that get through the initial screening are then 
investigated in detail. 
 
The investment process of angel groups is rather more extended and involves more stages. Two 
distinct approaches are apparent amongst the Scottish groups, although there are differences of 
detail in each approach. In both cases the gatekeeper is the initial point of contact for the 
business. The gatekeeper then undertakes the initial screening role. At its most basic this may 
simply be to filter businesses against the group’s key investment criteria. In other cases it is 
more proactive with the gatekeeper assessing the business plan and in some cases contacting 
the entrepreneur to gather information about the company. In some groups the gatekeeper may 
be assisted by one of the members, perhaps to bring in sector expertise.  
 
The differences in approach occur at the next stage. In some groups the businesses that get 
through the filtering and initial screening processes are evaluated in detail by a small group of 
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the angels. This may include a presentation by the entrepreneur to this inner core. They will 
make a collective decision whether or not to invest in the business themselves. If this inner 
core decide unanimously to invest then the opportunity is opened up to the rest of the group for 
each member to decide individually whether they also want to invest. This approach is typified 
by Archangels (Gregson et al, 2013a). In the alternative approach those businesses that get past 
the screening stage are presented to the group members. Typically the company will make a 
presentation. Some groups will coach the entrepreneurs prior to the presentation. Each 
individual member then makes their own decision whether or not they are interested in 
investing. If there is sufficient interest then a sub-group is established to do the due diligence 
and, if appropriate, negotiate the terms and conditions of the investment. The deal will then be 
brought back to the members to make individual decisions whether or not to invest. 
 
The key difference between these two approaches is therefore who drives the process after the 
initial screening stage. In the first approach it is driven by an active core group of angels, with 
the outer core only being invited to invest, on a take-it or leave-it basis, in those deals that the 
core group have decided to invest in. In the second approach the members drive the process, 
with the gatekeeper undertaking due diligence on those businesses that the membership are 
interested in.  
 
Compared with individual angels (Mason and Harrison, 1996c), raising finance from angel 
groups is more costly for the entrepreneur. None of the Scottish groups require entrepreneurs 
to ‘pay to pitch’; however, four groups charge fees associated with the due diligence process 
and the majority of groups charge deal/completion fees when the investment is made (typically 
3% of the amount raised) (10 groups) and also levy ongoing non-executive director monitoring 
fees (11 groups).  
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This investment process has a number of implications for entrepreneurs seeking finance from 
angel groups. First, there are more people involved in the process and hence more people have 
to be persuaded of the merits of the investment opportunity. Second, gatekeepers have the 
power to reject investment opportunities but it is the members who make the decision to invest. 
The entrepreneur has therefore to get past the gatekeeper in order to reach potential investors. 
Third, in contrast to traditional business angel networks, where the pitch to an audience of 
potential investors is at the start of the process and is used by the investors as the initial 
screening process, with angel groups the pitching stage occurs later in the process after the 
business has passed the initial screen. This, in turn, has implications for the content and style 
of the pitch. Fourth, raising finance from angel groups incurs fees whereas this would not 
typically be the case with individual angels. However, business angel networks also charge 
fees. Finally, given the various stages and different people involved, the length of time to secure 
an investment from an angel group will generally be longer than in the case of individual 
angels. 
 
THE GATEKEEPER 
The previous discussion has highlighted the critical role of the group gatekeeper in the 
investment process, managing both the day-to-day operations of the group and, more 
significantly, controlling access to investors. The emergence of this new actor is one of the 
most significant outcomes of the growth of angel groups, with considerable implications both 
for scholars who continue to focus on how individual angels make their investment decisions 
and also for entrepreneurs. Gatekeepers are of two types: member gatekeepers and manager 
gatekeepers (Paul and Whittam, 2010). Gatekeepers have typically emerged from within the 
group that initially started the angel group. In half of the groups (9) that were interviewed, 
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members act as managers (more than half of whom receive remuneration), five groups (28%) 
have hired an external manager and in the remaining four groups the gatekeeper role is shared 
between a member and someone that has been hired. The bigger groups have appointed external 
managers as they became larger. Some groups have gone further, hiving off a separate 
administrator function from the gatekeeper’s role. Indeed, in 11 of the 18 groups (61%) the role 
of gatekeeper is shared. The implication is that the gatekeeper function changes as the group’s 
activities increase and portfolio management becomes a more time consuming and critical 
function. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The gatekeeper undertakes a variety of functions (Table 3). Two-thirds of gatekeepers 
undertake external-facing roles, notably the promotion of the group to attract new investors 
and entrepreneurs. Around half also report that they undertake internal roles, mostly interacting 
and communicating with the members. However, their main functions are associated with 
managing the investment process. Gatekeepers review the business plans and executive 
summaries that they receive from entrepreneurs seeking finance, decide whether they meet the 
investment criteria of the group, may seek additional information and even meet the 
entrepreneur and ultimately make the decision whether the opportunity is passed on to the 
group members, whether an inner core or the entire group, to be considered for investment. 
The gatekeeper may also be responsible for preparing one or more supporting papers on the 
business for the group. The gatekeeper will also follow up with members to gauge their interest 
in the opportunity. In the second model, discussed in the previous section, if the group is 
interested in the business then the gatekeeper will also be involved in the due diligence process 
and even in the negotiation. It is of note that fewer than half of the gatekeepers are involved in 
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the process after the investment is made. Specifically, few gatekeepers see the preparation of 
investee companies for an exit being as being part of their role (Mason and Botelho, 2016). 
The norm is for a member of the group to take on the role of non-executive director in the 
investee company. It is only in the larger groups, which have more support staff, that the 
gatekeeper is involved in portfolio management. The majority (17 out of 21, or 81%) undertake 
this function on a part-time basis (less 30 hours a week). 
 
The backgrounds of the gatekeepers are remarkably varied. There is considerable variety in 
academic expertise, albeit with a bias to accounting, finance and law. Just under half reported 
work experience in banking, accountancy or corporate finance. Eleven (52%) had 
entrepreneurial experience and 15 (71%) have personal experience of making angel 
investments, reflecting the presence of a number of member angels as gatekeepers. The vast 
majority thought they were prepared for the role (95%), although those in the longer established 
groups were actually pioneers, defining and shaping the role.  
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Angel investing is changing from an invisible and largely individual process to one in which 
angels are joining together in organised and managed groups to invest. This is evident 
throughout the world (May and Liu, 2016), although the pace of change has varied between 
countries. Yet despite the growing significance of angel groups as a major source of finance 
for entrepreneurial companies at the start of the so-called funding escalator little scholarly 
attention has been devoted to this development, despite the possibility that it renders much of 
the existing research base redundant. Nor has there been much consideration of the practical 
consequences of this change either for entrepreneurs and investors nor the policy implications. 
  
 25 
 
This paper is the first attempt to provide an in-depth examination of the growth of angel groups 
and the implications for the financing of entrepreneurial ventures.  
 
The paper draws on evidence from Scotland where, for a variety of reasons, the emergence of 
angel groups has proceeded further than anywhere else outside of the USA. Indeed, in both 
absolute numbers and on a per capita basis Scotland’s population of angel groups is larger than 
that of the majority of US states. The latest Risk Capital Market Report (Young Company 
Finance, 2015) identifies 21 angel groups in Scotland compared with just two prior to 2000. 
Angels, alongside the co-investment fund, dominate investment activity in the £100,000 to £2m 
range. However, activity is skewed to a minority of larger and longer-established groups. 
 
Implications for the supply of entrepreneurial finance 
The existing debate about the implications of the growth of angel groups mainly focuses on the 
benefits, notably their greater visibility and greater professionalism compared with individual 
angels, which, it is argued, reduces the time and cost for the entrepreneur of raising finance. In 
addition it is thought to have expanded the supply of informal venture capital by attracting 
passive investors who lack the capabilities to invest on their own. However, others have raised 
the concern that the essence of angel investing is at risk of being lost as the process becomes 
more organised. Some have also expressed the concern that the angel market could evolve in 
the same way as venture capital funds, shifting to making larger and later stage investments 
and losing its ability to add value. 
 
Our evidence is finely balanced. On the supply side the process has reduced the number of 
investment decision-makers in the market as individual angels have joined angel groups. It has 
probably also reduced the number of investments of £50,000 and below which are too small to 
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be of interest to the groups. However, equity crowdfunding may fill this gap (Tuomi and 
Harrison 2017). Groups have focused on making larger investments and follow-on 
investments, with the latter dominating investment activity. The continued creation of new 
groups is therefore needed to mobilise new capital into the market to make new investments. 
On the other hand, the greater investment capability of angel groups has helped to fill the 
funding gap created by the decline of venture capital funds specialising in seed, start-up and 
early stage financing. From a process point of view angel groups extend the investment process, 
adding more stages and increasing the decision-time, and the gatekeeper now controls access 
to the angels. Moreover, market deficiencies remain. The emergence of angel groups, with 
government support, has helped resolve the ‘traditional’ equity gap (originally under £250,000 
but other definitions have put this figure closer to £1m). However it has opened up a ‘second’ 
equity gap (Murray, 1994; Sohl, 2012) above £1m-£2m for growth capital, beyond the 
capability of virtually all angel groups, even with syndication. This is a challenge for angel-
backed companies requiring growth capital to fulfil their potential and may result in their 
premature sale to overseas companies to the possible detriment of both investors and the 
regional economy. 
 
Moreover, Scotland’s angel market may be out of equilibrium. First, the availability of ERDF 
funding may have resulted in too many angel groups being created for the available investment 
opportunities. Second, it may have resulted in too many manager-led groups and limited 
involvement of individual members in contrast to the USA where there appears to be greater 
member involvement. Third, some of the angel groups may not be financially sustainable, 
certainly without the public sector support they receive. The groups most at risk are those that 
have expensive manager-gatekeeper functions and a process that is not sufficiently ruthless at 
the initial screening stage, combined with the lack sufficient volume of investment activity to 
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generate fee income. A further concern is that some groups appear to be evolving, not to 
become venture capital funds, as Sohl (2007; 2012) feared, but fund managers. Two Scottish 
groups have already made this transformation.10 
 
Finally, what has been the economic impact of Scotland’s much admired business angel 
market? The support that the angel market has received from the public sector both through 
ERDF funding and indirectly via the Enterprise Investment Scheme means that this question 
cannot be ignored. However, we lack sufficient evidence to make a judgement on what 
represents “success”. Taking the ‘glass half empty’ viewpoint, a strong case can be made that 
the impact has been disappointing. Investors have achieved relatively few exits (Mason and 
Botelho, 2016) and most of these have been small, with the consequence that little wealth has 
been created for recycling in new ventures, and management learning in a growth company 
context has been truncated. Moreover, their investments have not led to the creation of 
‘companies of scale’, a key focus of Scottish Enterprise policy over the past decade (Brown 
and Mason, 2012). The riposte from angel groups is that this is not their role. Moreover, the 
M&A market is dominated by small exits which give a good return to investors (Gray, 2012). 
Furthermore, the ability of angel groups to build ‘companies of scale’ is limited. These 
companies are likely to require significant additional amounts of finance and therefore carry a 
significant dilution risk for angels and also require appropriately experienced management.11 
                                                          
10 For example, Braveheart, now listed on AIM, describes itself as follows: Braveheart Investment Group plc 
was formed in 1997 and has been quoted on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM: BRH.L) of the London 
Stock Exchange since 2007. Headquartered in Perth, Scotland, it also has offices in Yorkshire. The Group has 
around £71m of funds under management across various regional and national funds and runs investment 
syndicates which Braveheart and its operating companies have established. The Group provides equity, loan and 
mezzanine funding to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Braveheart also invests on behalf of high 
net worth individuals, family offices, institutional investors and public sector organisations across the UK and 
Europe. (http://www.braveheartgroup.co.uk/about-us/)  
 
11 See Gregson et al (2013b) for the case of one business angel backed company that did become a company of 
scale and floated on the London Stock Market. In 2015 it was acquired by a Japanese company (Financial 
Times, 2015). 
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This highlights the challenges in aligning the objectives of policy-makers and the practices of 
the angel community. A glass ‘half full’ perspective would argue that Scotland has stumbled 
upon an effective model of angel investing that overcomes the limitations of its angel market 
imposed by its historic low level of entrepreneurial activity (Paul et al 2003). This model makes 
efficient use of its limited number of active angels to serve as nodes to cluster less 
knowledgeable money of high income individuals typically in the professions and who are 
looking for tax efficient investments. In the absence of such groups it is quite possible that this 
money will have been invested with the traditional fund managers who will not have channelled 
it either to entrepreneurial businesses or within Scotland.12  
 
Implications for policy 
The emergence of angel groups has several implications for policymakers seeking to promote 
angel investing. First, they need to choose whether to support angel groups and, if they are 
supporting BANs, whether support for angel groups (e.g. to cover their running costs) would 
be more effective. Both models result in entrepreneurs receiving funding from angel 
investors. From a public policy perspective, the evidence on the relative effectiveness of 
these models is not clear-cut. Moreover, there are different angel group models to those 
developed in Scotland. For example, Halo in Northern Ireland13 has developed a model in 
which they act as the first selection gate for angel groups, inviting them to large pitching 
events, while other groups that are not members of Halo will form an outer ‘ring’ to ‘bulk up’ 
the investments led by the groups. However, it is clear that angel groups need to be in place 
for a co-investment fund approach to work. Second, where tax incentives are available for 
angel investors these typically only apply when angels are investing directly in businesses (as 
                                                          
12 We are grateful to David Grahame, OBE, CEO of LINC Scotland , for this observation. 
13 http://www.nisp.co.uk/halo/about/ 
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in the case in the UK). It is therefore appropriate to ask whether tax incentives should also be 
available to angels to invest in pooled investment vehicles to enable angel groups to build 
sidecar funds. This is significant in the content of the emergence of a finance gap in the £1m-
£5m range. Third, context matters. LINC Scotland’s access to ERDF was critical in terms of 
the number and diversity of angel groups that have been created, and the dominance of 
manager-led models. The co-investment fund, which has been successfully replicated 
elsewhere (New Zealand, Canada), has also been critical.  
 
Implications for Research 
These changes in the angel market have major implications for research on angel investing. 
First, who is attracted to join angel groups? There is a suggestion that they are attracting 
individuals who would not have become solo angels. Younger angels in particular are likely 
to start their investing career with a group rather than as a solo investor (Mason and Botelho, 
2014). There is also emerging evidence that angels who invest as part of a community (i.e. 
who are members of groups or networks) manage their risk differently from those who invest 
on their own, notably in terms of their post-investment monitoring and involvement (Bonini 
et al; 2016). So, do members of groups fit the well-established profile of business angels? Or 
is this profile now out-of-date? Specifically, are angels who are members of groups as active 
as solo angels in managing their investments, and do they have the same ability to add value? 
If not then this challenges the view of business angels as ‘smart investors’. Moreover, given 
the increasing tendency for researchers to base their samples on angel group members it now 
begs the question whether this is an appropriate sampling frame. Is it meaningful to compare 
these investors with the angels profiled in prior research? Or are they a different population?  
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Second, it is clear that angel groups are characterised by diversity, for example, in terms of 
management and investment processes. However, sampling of angels is typically restricted to 
a single angel group (and one group in particular). 
 
Third, angel group investments typically involve more than one angel. However, much of the 
research continues to take a single angel perspective which seeks, for example, to explore the 
relationship between business angel characteristics and firm performance (Croce et al, 2016b) 
or how the human capital of angels influences valuation (Collewaert and Manigart, 2016) 
based on data from just a single investor in each business. The growth in investing by angel 
groups undermines the appropriateness of this type of analyses based on a single angel 
investor in a company.  
 
Fourth, the investment process of angel groups is different to that of solo angels, with more 
stages, more people involved and different people involved at different stages. This 
challenges the ongoing relevance of existing research on how business angels make their 
investment decisions. Moreover, there is evidence (Mason and Botelho, 2014; Botelho et al., 
2015a) that members of angel groups are likely to be influenced in their investment decision 
either by the gatekeeper or other group members. Given evidence that business angels learn 
from the experience of others (Harrison et al, 2015) and consequently may change the way 
they invest (Botelho et al., 2015b) it may be, as suggested by Mason et al (2016), that the 
emergence of angel groups is creating a unique opportunity for situated learning, potentially 
resulting in the emergence of a ‘community of practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991) with a 
shared repertoire of approaches to investing, resulting in a growing standardisation of 
investment assessment. 
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Fifth, the emergence of angel groups has created a new actor – the angel group manager – or 
gatekeeper - who plays a key role at the initial screening stage. Emerging research suggests 
that they perform this role in ways that are subtly different to that of solo angels (Mason and 
Botelho, 2017). Further research is needed on what is likely to be an evolving role. 
 
Sixth, we do not know what the emergence of angel groups means for the post-investment 
relationship. If many of the groups are passive investors does this create a ‘band width’ issue 
if this role is performed by a core group of angels? Or, is the value-added contribution 
enhanced by the diversity of skills and knowledge in the group.  
 
And finally, what are the broader implications for the early stage risk capital market of the 
emergence of angel groups. For example, how do they engage, if at all, with newer sources of 
finance such as crowdfunding platforms and accelerators? And can angel groups effectively 
fill the various funding gaps created by the demise of the traditional funding escalator (North 
et al, 2013; Baldock and Mason, 2015; Gill, 2015)? 
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 Figure 1 – Size Distribution of Angel Syndicate membership 
 
Source: compiled from interviews 
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 Figure 2. Number of investments made by angel groups in Scotland, 2000-2015  
 
 
Source: LINC Scotland 
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Figure 3 - Total aggregate transaction value of angel group investments in Scotland from 
2000 to 2015 
 
Source: LINC Scotland 
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 Figure 4. Amounts invested by angel groups in Scotland, 2000-2015  
 
 
Source: LINC Scotland 
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Figure 5 – Follow On Vs. First Round Investments 
 
 
 
 
Source: LINC Scotland 
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Table 1 - Venture capital investment in Scotland, 2009-14: number of investments and 
amount invested (£m)  
 
 
 
 
Source: Young Company Finance (2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Venture Capital Investments between £100,000 and £2 million 2012-14: 
number of investments and amounts invested (£m) 
 
 Number of 
investments 
Amount invested 
£m 
number % £m % 
Angels 230 32.9 50.1 33.1 
Venture capitalists 80 11.4 37.2 24.6 
Other private 120 17.2 17.8 11.8 
Public sector 269 38.5 46.3 30.6 
Total 699 100 151.4  
 
Source: Young Company Finance (2015)  
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 £m % £m % £m % £m % £m % £m % 
Angels 14 13.2 17 13.4 15 16.7 17 14.5 15 7.4 26 10.7 
Venture 
capital/ 
institutions 
53 50.0 76 59.8 48 53.3 69 59.0 155 76.7 157 64.3 
Scottish 
Enterprise 
/public 
31 29.2 24 18.9 18 20.0 21 17.9 21 10.4 49 20.1 
Other 8 7.5 10 7.9 9 10.0 10 8.5 11 5.4 12 4.9 
Total 106 100 127 100 90 100 117 100 202 100 244 100 
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Table 3. Gatekeeper Roles 
General function 
Proportion of 
gatekeepers 
citing this role 
Detailed function 
Proportion of 
total 
comments 
 
1. External 66.7 
Marketing 
Promotion 
Recruitment 
 
5.5 
6.3 
2.4 
2. Internal 52.4 
Interaction with members 
Organisation of the process 
Internal communication 
Administrative 
 
0.8 
1.6 
7.9 
7.9 
3. Investment Process 100.0 
Sourcing 
Screening 
Due diligence 
Negotiation 
Post-investment 
Exiting 
Others 
 
7.1 
21.3 
11.0 
7.1 
7.9 
3.1 
8.7 
4. Organisational 19.0 
Creation of group 
Development of group 
0.8 
0.8 
 
Source: compiled from interviews 
 
 
 
